Exercise GLACIER
NEC Assurance Exercise 2025

Post Exercise Report

Network
Emergency
Co-ordinator

GLACIER
NEC Assurance Exercise

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Exercise GLACIER was the Gas Industry's annual Network Gas Supply Emergency (NGSE) Network Emergency Co-ordinator (NEC) assurance exercise.

This report has been authored by the Office of the NEC. It serves as a record of the NEC Assurance Exercise GLACIER 2025.



The 'E1 Network Gas Supply Emergency Procedure' sets out how an NGSE is managed. Version 13 was published in December 2025. Click the image on the left to access this important document

Click the image on the right to watch a short video which explains the Emergency Framework

This is an interactive document. The buttons below feature on the left bottom corner of each page for your convenience. Use them as follows:

Home: takes you back to this page

Glossary: Link to abbreviations and definitions

Navigation: takes you to the next or previous page

Exercise Scope

The NEC Safety Case requires the NEC to develop and deliver an annual exercise.

The overriding aim of the exercise is to demonstrate to the NEC that the Gas Industry is prepared and able to meet its obligations in the event of a NGSE. The NEC is obligated to review the exercise to assure the objectives were met; outline any lessons identified; action areas for development; and publish the results of the review in a report to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), which is then shared with industry. Full details of the exercise aims and objectives can be found in Appendix 3. This year's exercise objectives were met, though learning points have been identified, which are summarised in the Learning Points section of this report. Exercise GLACIER took place over three days to the scope detailed below:

Monday 13th October Pre-Emergency

- Gas Balancing Notification
- Gas Availability Status (GAS) report
- Scale-back off-peak exit capacity
- Activation of Operating Margins contracts
- Stage 1: admission of 'emergency specification gas'

Tuesday 14th October Emergency

- Stage 2: entry point flow directions
- Stage 2: load shedding directions
- Public Appeal

Tuesday 21st October Isolation

- Stage 2: Priority customer load shedding directions
- Public Appeal Press Conference
- Stage 3: allocation and isolation
- Set the conditions for a Restoration Exercise

The overriding aim of the exercise was to demonstrate to the NEC that the Gas Industry is prepared and able to meet its obligations in the event of a NGSE.

Exercise GLACIER continued improving levels of participation across the Gas Industry. Over 400 individuals across more than 50 organisations took part, which allowed the opportunity to exercise processes and interactions across the energy sector. This level of participation also allowed for increased realism and provided opportunities for the responders to work through the challenges this can bring.

NGSE Strategy

Collaboration and shared understanding have improved and must be maintained to ensure continued success. Further refinements to isolation strategy should now be assessed to drive ongoing improvements and support a safe, efficient response.

Gas and Electricity Interactions

Significant progress has been made in embedding processes for interaction between GSO and NESO. The next priority is to strengthen clear pre-emergency capabilities for NGT and NESO, enabling rapid and transparent actions to minimise gas demand for power generation when required.

Gas Transporter Interactions

The modernisation of information sharing and ongoing efforts to collaborate on process improvements have accelerated response times in key interactions between Gas Transporters. Enhanced methods are now required to improve GDN demand estimation to support NEC decision making.

Public Comms

Communications teams have worked together to confirm effective control of communications during an emergency, addressing long-standing learning points and strengthening coordination. It is essential that these achievements are maintained and reinforced through future exercises and workshops to ensure continued readiness.

Load Shedding

Testing of the load shedding process on the National Transmission System (NTS) demonstrated a strong performance, emphasizing the importance of precise timing at sites to maintain electricity system stability. However, within LDZs, data quality remains a cause for concern, creating significant challenges for effective load shedding. Increased effort is needed to improve the accuracy and completeness of customer information, as this remains a critical factor in ensuring timely and reliable response during events.

Exercise Planning

The Office of the NEC will review and evolve the NEC Assurance Exercise to ensure it continues delivering robust pre-winter assurance and addresses recurring industry learning points. Future exercises will enable deeper analysis of critical emergency response aspects and complex issues, maintaining flexibility to adapt to emerging priorities.

NGSE Strategy

Collaboration and shared understanding have improved and must be maintained to ensure continued success. Further refinements to isolation strategy should now be assessed to drive ongoing improvements and support a safe, efficient response.

Notifications of a NGSE

The NEC is obligated to inform the Gas Industry (all organisations with a duty under GS(M)R to cooperate with the NEC) upon declaring an NGSE. This process is well tested and should ensure declarations are clear, comprehensive, and widely communicated. Information sharing is maturing year on year; there remains an opportunity to deploy an IT solution to support this. Various routes have been explored but a full-scale IT project looks to be the only option given the sensitivity of the data being passed.

Isolation

A key objective of this year's exercise was to provide sufficient time for Gas Distribution Networks (GDNs) to conduct isolation: this was achieved and allowed National Gas Transmission (NGT) and GDNs to dedicate a greater amount of time to isolation than in previous exercises. The exercise highlighted the need for earlier information exchange on isolation strategies to allow a comparative risk assessment of each potential option to be undertaken. A key learning is that the closer to the start of the gas day Stage 3 is declared the fewer consumer isolations are required no matter the isolation strategy chosen. Significant work has been undertaken by the GDNs to understand the impacts of isolation strategies to restoration timescales however this was not fully communicated by the GDNs, the importance of accurate reports sent to DESNZ was also noted.

There was limited clarity from GDNs and no common framework for assessing temperature-related risks across regions. Improving comparative risk assessment and communication of isolation options would enable more informed decision-making. These improvements should be evident in future restoration exercises, where strategies incorporating restoration considerations are expected to deliver faster recovery.

Learning Points

1. Deliver an online solution for issuing directions and instructions.
2. GDNs share analysis of the impacts and timescales for each isolation strategy with NGT to allow a comparative risk assessment to be presented to the NEC when requesting Stage 3 declarations.
3. Develop a RACI for GDNs providing returns on isolation impacts directly to DESNZ.

Relevant Working Group:

- Gas Task Group

Gas Transporter Interactions

The modernisation of information sharing and ongoing efforts to collaborate on process improvements have accelerated response times in key interactions between Gas Transporters. Enhanced methods are now required to improve GDN demand estimation to support NEC decision making.

GDN Demand Breakdown

When taking decisions during NGSE Stage 2 load shedding, the NEC has a requirement to understand the load breakdown within each GDN. This data is crucial in allowing the NEC to make effective and timely decisions about how much load shedding to instruct the GDNs to carry out. Current methods used by GDNs to estimate load breakdown are based on AQ (Annual Quantities) for each load band and do not consider daily nominations for large users. Work should now commence to develop and implement enhanced methodologies to estimate demand breakdown.

GDN Load Shedding Returns

Considerable work has been undertaken between NGT and the GDNs to improve the accuracy of load shedding returns. Wales and West Utilities (WWU) has developed a clear process and capability to estimate load shedding returns, which has been shared with and endorsed by the other GDNs. However, the remaining GDNs have not committed to meeting this standard, and it is unclear whether this is due to capability, resource, or other constraints. Consistency is critical—all GDNs should calculate returns in the same way to ensure proportionate action. It is recommended that NGT and GDNs work together to address these gaps and consider enhancements for testing in the next exercise.

Impacts of Electricity Demand Control

There remains a requirement for enhanced analysis of the implications of electricity demand control on the gas network's demand and physical operation. The Electricity and Gas Resilience Interactions Task Group (EGRIT) owned Review of Electricity Demand Disconnection on the Gas Asset System (REDDGAS) project has completed a review of existing analysis and begun engagement with subject matter experts to deliver the required enhancements before next winter. The outputs from this project should factored into GDN demand breakdown estimates when electricity demand control is in place.

Learning Points

4. Further enhancement of GDN demand breakdown estimates should be developed and implemented.
5. GDNs to deliver a consistent estimate of load shedding returns.
6. The initial findings from REDDGAS should be implemented into GDN demand forecasting methodologies.

Relevant Working Groups:

- Gas Task Group
- EGRIT

Load Shedding Performance

Testing of the load shedding process on the National Transmission System (NTS) demonstrated a strong performance, emphasizing the importance of precise timing at sites to maintain electricity system stability. However, within LDZs, data quality remains a cause for concern, creating significant challenges for effective load shedding. Increased effort is needed to improve the accuracy and completeness of customer information, as this remains a critical factor in ensuring timely and reliable response during events.

The NEMT again undertook assurance activity to contact all sites connected to the NTS with active gas flow during Exercise GLACIER, maintaining stable performance on the NTS comparable to previous years.

Work to introduce a new category for industrial connections that provide heat to domestic consumers is ongoing and expected to be in place ahead of the next assurance exercise. This will help ensure priority allocation reflects real-world consumer impact.

Attempts to assure Shippers meet their obligation to provide accurate emergency contact information remains a long-standing issue and now requires urgent attention. There is clear evidence that load shedding performance is being compromised by sites that cannot be contacted. Resolving this dependency is critical to restoring compliance levels as close to 100% as practicable.

The simulation of the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) framework highlighted the impact the shedding of priority customers would have on society particularly that of a small group of very critical sites.

Learning Points

7. Previous reminders from GDNs to Shippers about their UNC obligation to provide accurate emergency contact information for industrial sites have not delivered the necessary improvement. A stronger, more effective approach is now required to ensure Shippers meet their obligations.

Relevant Working Group:

- E3 Alignment Group

What is Load Shedding?

Load shedding is the procedure used by Gas Transporters at Stage 2 of an NGSE, to secure a graduated and controlled reduction in demand on all, or part, of their systems to keep the system securely pressurised.

This is achieved by making direct, or indirect, contact with large consumers and legally directing them to stop, or reduce, their consumption of gas, as per the Gas Safety (Management) Regulations 1996.

Load Shedding Performance – NTS

There are currently 59 sites directly connected to the NTS. During Exercise GLACIER contact was successfully made with 58 sites.

- 57 sites confirmed they would cease taking gas within one hour
- 1 site took longer than one hour to cease taking gas
- 1 site could not be contacted

Exercise GLACIER	
Successful Contact	Confirmation site would stop using gas within one hour (excluding those not instructed due to electricity system stability requirements):
98%	**97%**

Performance history (last 5 years)	
Exercise Name and Year of delivery:	Percentage of sites who could be contacted and would stop using gas within one hour:
GLACIER 2025	**97%**
FAHRENHEIT 2024	89%
EVEREST 2023	98%
DEGREE 2022	93%
CELSIUS 2021	96%

The National Transmission System



Load Shedding Performance - LDZs

Load shedding performance within the LDZs has declined over recent years, falling from 91% in 2021 to 88% in 2025, with a low point of 87% in 2024. Although the latest figure shows a slight improvement, performance remains well below the 100% target. This trend persists despite the attention E3AG and GDNs have drawn to the issue, highlighting that support from the regulator is now required. Inaccurate customer contact information continues to hinder effective action during load shedding events, and there is a growing number of cases where contact was made but gas usage did not cease, pointing to deeper behavioural and process challenges. These issues require detailed analysis and targeted action to drive performance as close to 100% as practicable.



Exercise GLACIER 2025 – Performance Breakdown

GDN	No. of sites attempted to be contacted	No. of sites where contact was made, and site would stop using gas		No. of sites where contact was made, and site would not stop using gas		No. of sites who could not be contacted	
Cadent	1000	908	(90.80%)	11	(1.10%)	81	(8.10%)
NGN	400	335	(83.75%)	23	(5.75%)	42	(10.5%)
SGN	600	489	(95%)	0	(0.0%)	111	(5%)
WWU	600	560	(93.3%)	0	(0.0%)	40	(6.7%)

Performance History (last 5 years)

Exercise Name and Year of delivery	No of sites attempted to be contacted	No of sites where contact was made, and site would stop using gas	
GLACIER 2025	2600	2292	88%
FAHRENHEIT 2024	2600	2274	87%
EVEREST 2023	2600	2345	90%
DEGREE 2022	2600	2319	90%
CELSIUS 2021	2600	2362	91%

Gas and Electricity Interactions

Significant progress has been made in embedding processes for interaction between GSO and NESO. The next priority is to strengthen clear pre-emergency capabilities for NGT and NESO, enabling rapid and transparent actions to minimise gas demand for power generation when required.

Load Shedding

Progress has been made in this area , in particular, NESOs ability to demonstrate a much-improved position on actions it can take on its own system to maximise reduction in gas demand for power once load shedding has been instructed. The iterative processes between NGT and NESO to determine the impact of reduced gas take at power stations still takes too long both pre-emergency for Operating Margins and in Stage 2 for firm load shedding. consequently, gas demand cannot always be reduced quickly enough to prevent an NGSE escalating particularly in the early stages of a gas supply shortage.

Work should continue to refine the sequencing process for directing gas-fired generators to cease gas intake without triggering electricity system instability. There should be a focus on reducing the time taken for NESO to provide the minimum required gas demand for power to maintain electricity system stability to as close to an hour as practicable.

Embedded Generation

Exercise GLACIER again highlighted the lack of visibility of gas fired generation embedded within the GDNs both to the GDNs and NESO. There is a risk that this generation would increase gas demand within the GDNs in response to larger CCGTs connected to the NTS being instructed to reduce gas take. Work should now commence to understand the behaviour of embedded generation in a GDE and investigate potential mitigations to this risk. This will necessitate detailed cross industry discussion and may involve whole-system market reform.

Learning Points

8. Reduce the time taken to understand and communicate the initial impacts of gas fired generation being directed to cease taking gas to as close to an hour as practicable.
9. Validate the scale of the risks associated with behaviour of embedded generation during load shedding of NTS connected gas power generation.

Relevant Working Group:

- EGRIT

Public Communications

Communications teams have worked together to confirm effective control of communications during an emergency, addressing long-standing learning points and strengthening coordination. It is essential that these achievements are maintained and reinforced through future exercises and workshops to ensure continued readiness.

Public Communications and Coordination

Exercise GLACIER marked a significant step forward in strengthening public communications and coordination during an energy emergency. Enhanced participation enabled a clearer and more confident demonstration of how government would first support and then assume central coordination. A key achievement was the successful simulation of activating the UK Emergency Alert platform upon the declaration of NGSE Stage 3—an action that would provide strong public reassurance in a real event.

This exercise showcased effective alignment between government and sector-led messaging, reinforcing trust and clarity. Building on this progress, sector communications should now work closely with DESNZ to capture and document how government messaging integrates with ongoing industry-led efforts. This will ensure clear roles, responsibilities, and sequencing for future events. The Comms Task Group (CTG) should continue refining pre-agreed key messages for each stage of response, ensuring readiness and consistency.

Corporate Affairs Response

The NGT Corporate Affairs Response Team demonstrated a notable evolution in approach, delivering more agile, proactive, and collaborative engagement throughout the exercise. This shift reflects a growing maturity in crisis communications and sets a strong foundation for future scenarios.

To embed these gains, further work is needed to consolidate the enhanced understanding of how government communications fit within sector-led frameworks, finalising the sequencing of joint messaging, and agree the pre-determined messaging for each stage of response ahead of the next NEC Assurance Exercise.

Learning Points

10. CTG to work with government to define the most effective approach for the delivery of mass public communications e.g. public appeals for demand reduction, requirements for isolation etc.
11. The consolidation and management of pre-determined messaging for each stage of a response.

Relevant Working Group

- Communications Task Group

Exercise Planning

The Office of the NEC will review and evolve the NEC Assurance Exercise to ensure it continues delivering robust pre-winter assurance and addresses recurring industry learning points. Future exercises will enable deeper analysis of critical emergency response aspects and complex issues, maintaining flexibility to adapt to emerging priorities.

Planning will take place to review how the NEC Assurance Exercise is delivered in future years. The aim is to ensure the exercise continues to provide robust pre-winter assurance while supporting the industry in addressing significant and recurring learning points identified through previous events.

The Office of the NEC will explore opportunities to evolve the exercise in ways that enable more detailed examination of critical aspects of emergency response and allow for comprehensive analysis of complex issues. This approach will focus on strengthening the value of the exercise as a tool for learning and improvement, while maintaining flexibility to respond to emerging priorities.

While the NEC Assurance Exercise will remain the central pre-winter test, consideration will be given to complementary activities that enhance stakeholder engagement and provide additional insight into specific challenges.

The Office of the NEC will retain project management control of all aspects of the exercise to ensure consistency, clarity, and effective coordination across all participants.

Summary of Learning Points

The 11 learning points arising from Exercise GLACIER are detailed below. These will be reviewed, and action plans progressed by the relevant industry group. The Office of the NEC will request that the Energy Resilience Group lead on the delivery of actions to address each learning point and shall report progress against these actions to the Energy Resilience Leadership Group and in regular NEC liaison meetings.

Learning Points	Deliverables	Task Group	Expected Completion Date
NGSE Strategy			
1. Deliver an online solution for issuing directions and instructions.	• Deliver portal project before next NEC Assurance Exercise • Conduct testing of portal with stakeholders	GTG	Sep 2026
2. GDNs share analysis of the impacts and timescales for each isolation strategy with NGT to allow a comparative risk assessment to be presented to the NEC when requesting Stage 3 declarations.	• Create a standardised template for GDNs to report isolation strategy impacts and restoration timelines • Conduct training sessions for GDN and NGT to evaluate and compare risks of different isolation strategies including the impacts to restoration.	GTG	Sep 2026
3. Develop a RACI for GDNs providing returns on isolation impacts directly to DESNZ.	• GDNs/ DESNZ to agree RACI and implement process ahead of next year's exercise.	GTG	Sep 2026
Gas Transporter Interactions			
4. Further enhancement of GDN demand breakdown estimates should be developed and implemented.	• Develop method of using daily nominations of large users in the demand breakdown. • Investigate alternatives to AQ for sites where nominated loads cannot be obtained.	GTG	Sep 2026
5. GDNs to deliver a consistent estimate of load shedding returns.	• GDNs to agree the standard of load shedding returns • Test returns in exercises during 2026	GTG	Sep 2026
6. The initial findings from REDDGAS should be implemented into GDN demand forecasting methodologies.	• Initial findings from REDDGAS should be factored into GDN demand forecasts when electricity demand control is active. • Process to be tested in next NEC Assurance Exercise	EGRIT	Sep 2026

Summary of Learning Points

Learning Points	Deliverables	Task Group	Expected Completion Date
Load Shedding Performance			
7. Previous reminders from GDNs to Shippers about their UNC obligation to provide accurate emergency contact information for industrial sites have not delivered the necessary improvement. A stronger, more effective approach is now required to ensure Shippers meet their obligations.	• Ofgem/ GDNs/ NGT to engage with Shippers and reinforce their obligation to provide emergency contact details. • Improvement in load shedding performance data by next NEC Assurance Exercise	E3AG	Sep 2026
Gas and Electricity Interactions			
8. Reduce the time taken to understand and communicate the initial impacts of gas fired generation being directed to cease taking gas to as close to an hour as practicable.	• Develop a streamlined tool to allow timely information exchange and assessment of initial impacts to electricity system. • Implement a time-boxed process for NESO and NGT to assess impacts • Conduct joint training and timed drills outside of main NEC exercise	EGRIT	Sep 2026
9. Validate the scale of the risks associated with behaviour of embedded generation during load shedding of NTS connected gas power generation.	• Develop a deeper understanding of operation of embedded generation. • Assess how embedded generation responds during load shedding • Produce a report validating the scale of risk to gas demand and system stability • Identify and evaluate potential mitigations	EGRIT	Sep 2026
Public Communications			
10. CTG to work with government to define the most effective approach for the delivery of mass public communications e.g. public appeals for demand reduction, requirements for isolation etc.	• Develop a clear framework outlining govt led comms integrate with sector led messaging during an emergency • Define the most effective approach for delivering public communications at scale • Conduct joint exercises with DESNZ and CTG to validate the framework, messaging, and delivery mechanisms ahead of the next NEC Assurance Exercise	CTG	Sep 2026
11. The consolidation and management of pre-determined messaging for each stage of a response.	• Catalogue a set of pre-determined key messages for each stage of response	CTG	Sep 2026

Progress Since Exercise FAHRENHEIT (2024)

The learning points arising from the 2024 NEC Assurance Exercise FAHRENHEIT are set out in the following tables, along with an update statement and completion status.

- Where a learning point has been marked as **closed,** this does not mean that it should not be revisited, or the learning utilised to inform a similar area, or alternate process.
- Where a learning point is marked as **ongoing,** the learning point from this year's report (Exercise GLACIER) is referenced to demonstrate that understanding is developing, and progress has been made since the original identification of this learning.

Out of the 12 learning points arising from Exercise FAHRENHEIT, 8 are considered closed and 4 are ongoing due to the scale of the work scope (see progress statements for further detail).

Learning Points From Exercise FAHRENHEIT	Update	Task Group	Status
NGSE Strategy			
1. NGSE declarations should be clear, comprehensive and wide reaching across both the gas and electricity sectors	NGSE Declarations have been updated, and distribution of declarations has been reviewed to include DESNZ, NESO and other organisations	EGRIT	**Closed**
2. The delivery of a 'modernised online approach' to information sharing between Gas Transporters is still required	From a broader industry perspective, the technical capability to share information has been fully explored, with several off-the-shelf solutions tested throughout 2025. This testing has highlighted that a bespoke IT solution will ultimately be required. Given the complexity of the systems and data involved, such a solution will require careful scoping and sufficient time for implementation.	E3AG	**Closed**

Progress Since Exercise FAHRENHEIT (2024)

Learning Points From Exercise FAHRENHEIT	Update	Task Group	Status
NGSE Strategy			
3. Consideration should be given for the ability of an online approach for issuing directions and instructions	A project is underway to develop a secure online portal that will allow NESO, GDNs, and other stakeholders to share near real-time operational and emergency data. The portal will provide role-based access to ensure information is shared safely and appropriately. This is a significant IT project that will take time to deliver.	GTG	**Ongoing GLACIER LP 1 Expected completion by Sep 2026**
4. Continue to mature cross organisational appreciation of the lead times involved in key response actions	NGT and NESO have mapped the response tools available within each system, progressed to the planning for commissioning a study to assess the safety, disruptive, and financial impacts. NGT and NESO have conducted a series of joint sessions focused on deepening the understanding of the RIGSSE tool. Training sessions held by both NESO and NGT coving emergency frameworks, control room operations and market.	EGRIT	**Closed**
5. The Gas Task Group's Isolation Working Group should continue to optimise how isolation allocation is directed and deployed	Significant progress has been made by The Gas Task Group's Distribution Network Resilience Group (DNRG) to optimise isolation strategies. The Glacier review highlighted that this work was not effectively communicated to NGT during the exercise and so could not be factored into NEC decisions. This learning point has been closed but work should now commence under GLACIER LP 2 to improve the communication of isolation stratifies and impacts.	GTG	**Closed**

Progress Since Exercise FAHRENHEIT (2024)

Learning Points From Exercise FAHRENHEIT	Update	Task Group	Status
Gas Transporter Interactions			
6. There is a requirement for enhanced analysis of the implications of electricity demand control on the gas network's demand and physical operation	EGRIT Workstream 3 has been established to assess the impact of the Review of Electricity Demand Disconnection on the Gas Assets System (REDDGAS). This workstream has now formally commenced and has begun engaging with relevant industry stakeholders to develop a comprehensive list of assumptions that will underpin the analysis. As part of the initial engagement, the REDDGAS workstream leads hosted a meeting in which the outline the scope and objectives of the workstream were presented, and a number of key assumptions were discussed and validated with representatives from relevant industry partners.	EGRIT	**Ongoing GLACIER LP 6 Expected completion by Sep 2026**
7. Further reflections are required by the GDNs to ascertain what information regarding the converse system would be freely available to distribution operators	This was due to be completed prior to Exercise GLACIER as part of a NESO led comms exercise. Exercise LABYRINTH was conducted in November 2025, the required reflections have now been completed, and clarity has been established on the information that will be accessible to distribution operators.	GTG	**Closed**

Progress Since Exercise FAHRENHEIT (2024)

Learning Points From Exercise FAHRENHEIT	Update	Task Group	Status
Load Shedding			
8. Previous attempts by the GDNs to remind Shippers of the UNC obligation to provide accurate emergency contact information for their industrial sites have not been successful in influencing an improvement. A revised approach is still required	Efforts to improve Shippers' compliance with the UNC obligation to maintain accurate emergency contact details for industrial sites have so far been unsuccessful, and a revised approach is being implemented. A multi-party meeting involving Ofgem, DESNZ, NGT, SGN, Xoserve, and Corella agreed to engage Regulation Managers and raise the issue at the Distribution Working Group. The matter was subsequently presented to the group, and a follow-up meeting identified the contract changeover period as a key intervention point. Distribution Networks committed to checking customer data for obvious inaccuracies. Reminders were issued to Shippers and large customers at the National Gas Energy Forum and reinforced at subsequent Distribution Working Group sessions. Clear direction from Ofgem is now required to close this issue	E3AG	**Ongoing GLACIER LP 7 Expected completion by Sep 2026**
9. Work will now commence on the classification, and therefore position in the load shedding hierarchy, for industrial connections which provide heat to domestic consumers	In April 2025, a workshop was held with key stakeholders to discuss creating a new priority customer category. It was agreed to move forward with this idea, with the category being defined within existing frameworks to keep changes simple. Further discussions explored how to implement this efficiently, and initial estimates suggest it could take up to 12 months to complete the necessary steps. The proposal was submitted in July and approved to begin detailed planning. The next stages involve collaboration between several organizations, followed by testing in 2026 to ensure everything works as intended.	GTG	**Closed-Awaiting implementation**

Progress Since Exercise FAHRENHEIT (2024)

Learning Points From Exercise FAHRENHEIT	Update	Task Group	Status
Gas and Electricity Interactions			
10. A full and detailed review of the process for sequencing the direction for a gas fired generator to cease taking gas without triggering electricity system instability is required	Ongoing collaboration is taking place to enhance the "RIGSSE Tool" and its associated processes. NESO holds ownership of this action within EGRIT and has indicated that the revised tool is expected to be finalised by the end of 2026. NGT has facilitated workshops with Subject Matter Experts to articulate our requirements for the tool. Additionally, table-top exercises have been conducted between NESO and NGT to identify current challenges and immediate improvements needed to ensure operational readiness prior to the formalisation of the new tool in 2026.	EGRIT	**Ongoing GLACIER LP 8 Expected completion by Sep 2026**
11. The most appropriate process to deliver NEC directions to gas fired generators should be determined, with input from generators and NESO	NGT and NESO have jointly reviewed and updated the language used in Load Shedding direction notices. The aim has been to ensure that these notices are comprehensible and actionable for contacts at gas-fired power stations, thereby reducing the risk of miscommunication during critical response periods.	EGRIT	**Closed**

Progress Since Exercise FAHRENHEIT (2024)

Learning Points From Exercise FAHRENHEIT	Update	Task Group	Status
Public Communications			
12. Further work is now required to confirm the likely timings and primacy of communications during a gas supply shortage with associated electricity demand control measures	Positive progress evident from the CTG exercise with agreement on primacy, however, it is now clear that Govt would be willing to take primacy early on in a potential emergency, for exercising purposes it is not expected that those elements of Govt would participate so Gas and Electricity comms teams would need to continue coordinating crisis comms.	CTG	**Closed**

Appendices

OFFICIAL – FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Appendix 1 – Exercise Participants

The NEC Office estimates that over 400 industry participants took part in Exercise Fahrenheit from a range of areas, as illustrated here:

Government and Regulators
Department for Energy Security and Net Zero
North Sea Transition Authority
Health and Safety Executive
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets

National Gas Transmission
Crisis Management Team
Network Emergency Management Team
Corporate Affairs Response Team
National Transmission System Silver Command

Network Emergency Co-Ordinator

National Energy System Operator

Future Energy Networks

Energy Networks Association

Electricity System Distribution Network Operators

Terminal Operators and LNG Importation Terminals	
Terminals:	
Easington – Gassco, Langeled	St.Fergus – Ancala (Wood), SAGE
Easington – Centrica Storage, Rough	St. Fergus – NSMP (PX)
Easington – Perenco, Dimligton	St. Fergus – Shell
Burton Point - ENI	St. Fergus – National Gas
Bacton - Shell	Teeside – Antin (Wood), CATS
Bacton – National Gas	Teeside - PX
Bacton - SEAL	Barrow – Spirit Energy
Bacton - Perenco	Somerset Farm
	Angus Energy
LNG Terminals:	
Milford Haven – South Hook	
Milford Haven – Dragon	
Isle of Grain – National Grid	

Storage Facilities
Aldborough – Equinor / SSE Gas Storage
Hatfield Moor – Scottish Power
Hilltop – Kistos
Hole House Farm – Kistos
Holford - UniPer
Hornsea – SSE Gas Storage
Humbly Grove – Humbly Grove Energy
Stublach - Storengy

Shippers

National Transmission System – Directly Connected Sites

Gas Distribution Network Operators
Cadent
Northern Gas Networks
SGN
Wales and West Utilities

Interconnectors
BBL – BBL Company
Irish Interconnector – Gas Networks Ireland
Interconnector Limited

Appendix 2 – The NEC

The Network Emergency Co-ordinator (NEC) is an independent industry role, established under the Gas Safety (Management) Regulations (GS(M)R) 1996, whose duty is to co-ordinate the actions across affected points of the Gas Network to prevent or minimise the consequences of a Network Gas Supply Emergency (NGSE). This is defined as "an emergency endangering persons arising from a loss of pressure in a network, or part thereof".

The role of the NEC is currently undertaken by National Gas and is independent from any commercial interests of any organisation within the Gas Industry.

Industry participants such as Transporters and Shippers have a legal duty to cooperate with the NEC, who has the powers to direct the defined duty holders. The arrangements and procedures in place to facilitate these powers are tested annually.

Appendix 3 – Exercise Aim and Objectives

The aim of this exercise is to demonstrate that the Gas Industry is prepared and able to meet its obligations in the event of a Network Gas Supply Emergency. This will be demonstrated by effective two-way communication processes across the industry and its stakeholders; timely and accurate information being shared between participants; and effective emergency strategies being produced and implemented.

In achieving this demonstration, the following objectives will be met:

- Test the management of an emerging gas supply shortage, using warning notices and the establishment of proactive communication channels, testing newly developed Situation Reports, then gain an understanding of how these are received by industry (post exercise).
- Introduce a scenario that will involve participation from security teams across Industry and Government.
- Test the development and delivery of the pre-emergency strategy, through:
  - the simulated activation of all viable commercial and physical tools.
  - the capability of the Primary Transporter to form an accurate situational awareness through industry collaboration.
- Practice and enhance processes and tools associated with the interactions between gas and electricity organisations during times of whole energy system stress, supported by active participation from the National Energy System Operator and Electricity Distribution Network Operators.
- Test industry's ability to warn and inform the public through participation of Corporate Affairs representatives from the Energy Networks Association, Gas Transporters, the National Energy System Operator and Electricity Network Operators.
- Allowing additional time for isolation activities to enable Gas Distribution Networks to fully exercise and validate their operational procedures.
- Test that recommendations from previous industry emergency exercises, including completed learning points, have been delivered and are effective.
- Validate emergency procedures, specifically, Recent structure changes to the NGT NEMT, National Gas E3, E3 documents of the Distribution Networks, E1 Network Gas Supply Emergency Procedure and NEC Safety Case.
- Gather data in preparation for an Isolation exercise in 2026.

Appendix 4 – List of Abbreviations and Definitions

Abbreviations

CTG	Communications Task Group (App 5 – Industry Working Groups)	**GTG**	Gas Task Group (App 5 – Industry Working Groups)
DESNZ	Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (UK Government) (DESNZ Website)	**HSE**	Health and Safety Executive (UK Government) (HSE Website)
DNO	Distribution Network Operator (Electricity) (ENA website – Who's My Network Operator)	**LDZ**	Local Distribution Zone - within Gas Distribution Networks
ERG	Energy Resilience Group (Formerly Emergency Executive Committee (E3C) (App 5 – Industry Working Groups)	**MCM**	Million Cubic Metres (Gas unit of measurement for NTS)
EGRIT	Electricity & Gas Resilience Interactions Task Group see (App 5 – Industry Working Groups)	**MN**	Gas Margins Notice (NGT Website)
ENCC	Electricity National Control Centre (NESO)	**NCC**	National Control Centre (National Gas Transmission)
FEN	Future Energy Network (FEN Website)	**NEC**	Network Emergency Co-ordinator (App 2 - The NEC)
NESO	National Energy System (NESO Website)	**NEMT**	Network Emergency Management Team (National Gas Transmission)
GBN	Gas Balancing Notification (NGT Website)	**NGSE**	Network Gas Supply Emergency (NGT website)
GDN	Gas Distribution Network (Find My GDN Website)	**NTS**	National Transmission System (National Gas Transmission)
GS(M)R	Gas Safety (Management) Regulations	**NSTA**	North Sea Transition Authority (UK Government) (NSTA website)
GSO	Gas System Operator (National Gas Transmission)	**Xoserve**	Central Data Service provider (Gas Market) (Xoserve website)

Appendix 4 – List of Abbreviations and Definitions

Abbreviations

CCGT	Combined Cycle Gas Turbine	**Ofgem**	Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem Website)
RIGGSE	Review of the Impact of a Gas Supply Shortage on the Electricity System	**REDDGAS**	Review of Electricity Demand Disconnection on the Gas Assets System – NESO Project

Definitions

E1 NGSE Procedure	The procedure determines the processes which the Primary Transporter (National Gas Transmission) will follow in the management of an NGSE, whether potential or actual, as obligated by the Network Emergency Co-ordinator Safety Case.	**GAS Report**	Gas Available Status Report which enables the GSO to better request information, to understand gas availability from the offshore and onshore sector.
Emergency Specification Gas	GS(M)R makes provision to widen the standard gas quality specification to 'prevent a supply emergency'.	**Netman 1**	The name of the form used by Gas Distribution Network operators to share the detail and breakdown of their end of day demand profiles.
Embedded generation	Generation (including that fired by gas) which is connected to electricity distribution systems.	**ESEC**	The Electricity Emergency Supply Code (ESEC) describes steps which the UK Government could take to deal with an electricity supply emergency (see .Gov.UK website).

Appendix 5 – Industry Working Groups

Energy Resilience Group (ERG) – Formerly Energy Emergency Executive Committee (E3C)

The Energy Resilience Group are the principal fora for identifying both the risks and mitigating processes and actions necessary to manage the impact of emergencies affecting the supply of gas and/or electricity to consumers in GB.

NEC Safety Case Forum

Bi-annual meetings are held with this Duty Holder group to ensure that developments to the NEC's Safety Case and responses to an emergency are agreed and implemented across the Gas Transporters.

E3 Alignment Group (E3AG)

A subgroup of the NEC Safety Case Forum, focused on the alignment of NGSE Management & operational processes between Gas Transporters. The group focuses primarily on the issues of communications, procedures, data transfer and the responsibilities of the respective Gas Transporters.

Gas Task Group (GTG)

The GTG facilitates Gas Industry and government dialogue to enable effective emergency planning and response, effective development of policy, standards and codes, increase resilience through risk identification and delivery of mitigation actions; and to ensure continuous improvement through exercising and implementation of lessons learned.

Electricity Task Group (ETG)

The ETG's role is to ensure that the electricity sector in Great Britain is aware of, and prepared for, a variety of emergencies that may negatively impact electricity supply and, more widely, the energy sector.

Communications Task Group (CTG)

The CTG exists to support and foster effective government, regulator and industry wide collaboration on issues relating to communications around gas and electricity sector emergencies.

Electricity & Gas Resilience Interactions Task Group (EGRIT)

In 2021, the RIGSSE (Review of the Impact of a Gas Supply Shortage on Electricity) Task Group was formed to facilitate Gas Industry, Electricity Industry, Government and regulatory dialogue to review current 'whole energy system' interactions in the event of a gas supply shortage, or restrictions on the ability to transport gas, which impact the electricity network. The 'review' activities of the RIGSSE Task Group closed at the end of 2021 with the publication of an opportunities report. The RIGSSE Task Group has now been replaced by a more sustained position in the form of the Electricity & Gas Resilience Interactions Task Group (EGRIT), responsible for driving forward the RIGSSE opportunities which have not already been developed, and to horizon scan for further opportunity areas.

Appendix 6 – Priority Customers

Under Condition 6, Paragraph 15 of the Gas Transporters Standard Licence Conditions, Gas Transporters are obliged to establish, amend and review a list of Priority Customers who should be the last to be directed to cease taking gas in the shedding hierarchy, where this is necessary for safety reasons.

In accordance with Condition 6, Paragraph 16 and 17 of the Gas Transporters Standard Licence Conditions, the Secretary of State for Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) (now referred to as DESNZ) has directed the Gas Transporters to base their lists on the following classes of relevant customers:

Category A	Consumers where a failure in the supply to their premises could put lives at risk.
Category B	Relevant customers for which the sudden loss of gas causes, or threatens to cause, serious damage, for an unacceptably prolonged period, to human welfare, the environment or the security of the United Kingdom that cannot be reasonably mitigated
Category C	Relevant customers taking over 2 million therms per annum for which the sudden loss of gas would result in repair or replacement costs amounting to 10% or more of the Site Fixed Tangible Asset Value

Network
Emergency
Co-ordinator